M. Kerensky, in the course of which he had asked if anything was yet settled about the Emperor.

M. Kerensky had replied :—

> " that on the following day he would be going himself to Tsarskoe Selo, but that *he was of opinion that the Czar would be unable to set out for England within the next month. Until they had finished their examination of the documents they had seized, they could hardly permit him to leave, and M. Kerensky urged me not to use any pressure to try to induce the Government to let him go earlier*. I assured him that I had no such intention, although of course we were anxious that everything should be done to ensure the Emperor's safety. . . ."

The Ambassador further told us in this wire that he had pleaded for permission to hand the Empress Marie some letters for her from her sister, Queen Alexandra, but had been begged by Kerensky not to do so, as if the Government allowed it they would be charged by the extremists with encouraging intrigues.

It was clear from this cable that the net around the Imperial family was being drawn tighter, and that feeling was already hardening in Russia against the policy of allowing the Czar to leave Russia.

M. Kerensky was obviously not prepared to accept the responsibility of permitting the Czar to leave Russia at that date.

On receipt of Sir George Buchanan's

telegram the War Cabinet conferred about the matter. The difficulty of keeping our invitation open was growing. Opinion in France was opposed to the Czar taking up his residence in any Allied country. It was felt there that it might tend to create a feeling of suspicion amongst the revolutionary elements in Russia, whose